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Abstract
Safety cases become increasingly important for software certification. Models play a crucial role in building
and combining information for the safety case. This position paper sketches an ideal model-based safety
case with defect hypotheses and failure characterisations. From this, open research issues are derived.
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1 Introduction
The proliferation of software-intensive technical systems has resulted in a growing
need for methods to demonstrate their safety and reliability. The goal of such
methods is to develop a safety case for a system – a line of argument that establishes
safety and reliability properties from known properties of the components of the
system.
Various approaches exist: Leveson et al. [7] describe an FTA-like approach to
examine Ada programs, while Giese et al. [3] show how HAZOP-like safety anal-
yses can be based on component and deployment diagrams of the UML. Within
the ISAAC project [2], models of functional, geometrical and human aspects are
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Many models have been proposed for system lifecycles, and for the engineering, safety and
software development processes by which they are created. For the purposes of examining the
roles of the analysis techniques surveyed here, a simple “V” model (adapted from McDermid and
Rook [59]) is sufficient. The inner “V” in Figure 2 shows the major activities in an idealised
system development process; the round-cornered boxes around the outside of the “V” show the
safety tasks which are associated with these development activities. Sections 2.2.1 to 2.2.6 briefly
describe the purpose and conduct of each of the safety tasks.
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Figure 2 - V lifecycle model showing safety activities
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Hazard identification is the first step in the safety process, and sets the context for all subsequent
activities. Its role is to identify the potential hazards in the proposed system so that they can be
managed and controlled. The techniques required in this phase are generally exploratory, asking
“what if ” type questions.
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Risk assessment (often called hazard analysis) examines each of the identified hazards to
determine how much of a threat they pose, i.e. the severity and likelihood of potential accidents.
Fig. 1. Safety activities in a development process (Source: [9, p. 29])
integrated for safety analyses. Pumfrey [9] gathers a list of nine factors for success
of safety analysis methods and goes on to develop two methods for dealing with
mixed hw/sw systems.
In all these approaches the use of models plays a central role in the construction
of a safety case. While earlier approaches are based on structured reviews of models,
recently formal verification techniques have been applied for model analysis [1,3,5,2].
However, a systematic approach to the definition of those models is still uncommon.
It is also an open issue how to justify the appropriateness of the underlying models
for the safety case: Is it possible to derive all relev nt hazards, system failures and
component faults, and is it possible to reason about the causal chai s that link
them? In other words, we believe that the major open issue is how to reason about
the choice of models, and not so much how to reason about the properties of the
models.
In addition to this principal issue of the appropriateness of the models, we believe
that there are a number of core success factors for building model-based safety cases:
• Seamless integration into development processes. It is not sufficient to merely
perform a single safety analysis for certification of the final system – analyses
with different focus play their role throughout system development, in order to
clarify requirements, designs, and in general to improve both product and process
(see Fig. 1).
• Consideration of system, platform and environment. It is not sufficient to exam-
ine models for the functional behaviour (even if they are augmented with fault
models, as in [5]) of a system by verification or tests. Since hazards manifest
themselves in the system’s environment, the environment must also be modelled
and included in the analysis. Since faults often are caused by the underlying
computing platform, the platform must also be included; possibly, abstract user
models may be needed to reason about operator errors and ways to avoid them or
to deal with them. Note that in the development process these different models
may well be constructed and analysed at different times: For instance, a prelimi-
nary hazard analysis (corresponding to the top left activity in Figure 1) may need
only rather abstract environment and system models.
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Fig. 2. A simplified example of a safety argument using GSN and context information from models
• Heterogeneous reasoning. Finally, in order to cope with the realities of systems
development practice, where different components – some newly developed, some
legacy, some off-the-shelf – of different sources are combined, a compositional
approach to the development of safety cases with a mixture of quantitative and
qualitative reasoning is needed. While some properties may be demonstrated
through rigorous verification or testing, others may be based on statistical rea-
soning (as in some applications of FTA) and empirical data.
In this paper we outline a research agenda for model-based safety cases that tries
to give answers for some of these issues. In Section 2, we give a short overview over
the argumentation behind a safety case and in Section 3 we look at the requirements
on models and modelling languages that can support the building of safety cases.
Section 4 lists some of the open research issues, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Safety Case
In general, a safety case is a structured line of arguments that shows that the
system under consideration is safe. One of the difficulties is that a large variety of
information needs to be combined to form this argument. A single safety assurance
method is never able to show the complex issue of safety completely. Hence, formal
verification, statistical testing, process conformance and other information must be
integrated for a convincing argument.
A description technique that has proven to be useful for constructing safety
arguments is the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [6]. It reduces some problems,
such as ambiguity, of purely textual descriptions. An example safety argument using
GSN is shown in Fig. 2. In this example the overall goal G1 is that the system is
safe. This is intended to be achieved by two strategies: S1 is to ensure there are
no failures in terms of deviations from the intended safety-critial functionality, and
S2 arguments by showing that there are also no hazards in the absence of failures.
Hence, defect hypotheses as well as possible hazards must be identified. This is
depicted by the two constraints C2 and C3. From the strategies, four refined goals
are derived. G2 expresses that all relevant defects need to be considered, which is
shown by using defect pattern libraries in solution Sn1. G3, G4 and G5 describe
further goals for failures and hazards, which are met by the exemplary solutions
3
Braun, Philipps, Scha¨tz, Wagner
Sn2, Sn3 and Sn4. Important for the following is also that there are several
context informations like C1, the characterisations of failures, and models of the
behaviour of the system (C4) and the environment (C5).
In summary, the example shows that a variety of information needs to be consid-
ered when constructing a safety case. From a methodological point of view, safety
requirements and hazards need to be identified. However, this is not sufficient. It is
also necessary to build models that form the context for more detailed arguments,
for example about specific components. Moreover, the models must be able to han-
dle deterministic as well as probabilistic information and need not only to include
the system itself but also its environment.
3 Model-Based Safety Assurance
Model-based development is becoming a common-place approach to embedded (con-
trol) software construction; models, which describe the nominal functionality, are
found in form of plant models, e.g., for in-the-loop testing, as well as controller
models, e.g., for production-code generation. In some areas, the generation of pro-
duction code from models is already state-of-the-art.
However, without specifically addressing the issue of safety-cases, models of the
nominal functionality describing the system under development are not sufficient
for the analysis of fail-safe behaviour. To apply the models used in a model-based
development approach to the construction of a safety-case,
• a model of the system must be derived to describe the effective functionality,
including nominal as well as defect-affected behaviour.
• a model of the environment must be constructed to explicitly model the assump-
tions about the behaviour of the environment.
• explicit hypotheses of defects – expressed solely in terms of the system – must be
provided to avoid mistaking fail-safe behaviour of the model for fail-safe behaviour
of the system.
• explicit characterisation of failures – expressed solely in terms of the interface
between system and environment – must be provided to allow identifying devia-
tions from the intended behaviour in the interaction between the system and its
environment.
• explicit identification of hazardous situations – expressed solely in terms of the
environment – must be provided to allow describing hazards in terms of the con-
trolled environment rather than the controlling system.
Therefore, when extending the construction of the nominal functionality of a system
to the construction of a safety-case, the issues of defect hypotheses, failure charac-
terisations, as well as a hazard identifications must be addressed in the safety case,
making implicit assumptions explicit.
A failure characterisation describes unintended functionality of the system,
which may potentially lead to hazardous situation. In the safety-case it is used
to link the line of argument between the environment model and the system model.
A defect hypothesis describes how the nominal functionality of a system is al-
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tered to reflect the possible occurrences of faults. As defects may be introduced
in different parts of a system, different defect hypotheses are needed, e.g, to reflect
defects caused by a deviation from the intended functionality of the system platform
(i.e., hardware defects), or faults caused by a deviation from the intended control
functionality (i.e., design defects). For practical application, defect hypotheses are
often described in form of fault patterns, e.g., in form of intermittent occurrences
of value changes to reflect influences of alpha radiation.
A hazard identification describes states of the controlled environment to be
avoided by the nominal functionality of the system. However, as noted by [4]
and [8], especially in the context of embedded or software-intensive systems, the
functionality of the system is often only adequately expressed over the part of the
environment, which is only indirectly controlled or monitored by the system under
development. Therefore, to describe the achievement and failure of functionality, a
hazard identification independent of the model of the system is needed.
Separating these three properties as well as using separate models of system and
environment reduces the complexity of the overall argument and minimises the risk
of constructing inadequate lines of arguments.
As shown in Figure 2, based on these five models, now a formalised and stan-
dardized line of argument can be constructed to show the absence of hazardous
situations based on the defect hypotheses. This line of argument is constructed in
six steps:
(i) The defect hypothesis is validated to ensure that all relevant defects are in-
cluded.
(ii) The hazard identification is validated to ensure that all relevant hazards are
included.
(iii) The model of the system is verified with respect to conformance of the defect
hypothesis, i.e., the system does not constrain the possibility of such defects.
(iv) The model of the environment is verified with respect to conformance of the
hazard identification, i.e. the environment does not constrain the possibility of
such hazards.
(v) The model of the system is verified with respect to the avoidance of failure
situations under the given defect hypothesis.
(vi) The model of the environment is verified with respect to the avoidance of
hazardous situations under the given absence of failures.
For each of these steps, different solution techniques can be applied. E.g., applying
defect patterns for the identified defects can be used in step iii, while a simulation
of the environment model can be used in step iv. Furthermore, steps v and vi
themselves are complex verification goals, requiring appropriate sub-goals and sub-
solutions.
4 Open Research Issues
Based on the ideas of the previous section, we briefly state the most important open
issues that need to be addressed.
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Safety Case. To start with, how can safety requirements and possible hazards
be effectively elicited? When is the safety case complete? A strong structure needs
to be provided for the safety engineering in the form of safety patterns and reusing
existing parts of safety cases. Moreover, the approach has to be mapped to existing
(an potentially new) standards to allow certification.
Models. In general, the question is how can be assured that the built models
are suitable for safety analysis. The quality of these models is decisive for the whole
safety case. There is a plethora of questions: On what level of granularity are the
models built? What are suitable interfaces between components so that complex
causal chains can be analysed? What are proper defect hypotheses and failure
characterisations? Too much detail is not manageable, not enough detail leads to
omissions.
Supporting Methods. Finally, various and diverse methods need to be used
for arguing in the safety case. Hence, quantitative and qualitative as well as deter-
ministic and probabilistic methods need to be used and integrated in the argument.
When is formal verification needed and feasible, when are other arguments necessary
and sufficient?
5 Conclusions
Safety cases become increasingly important for software-intensive systems. The
current state-of-practice, FTA and FMEA, are not sufficient for the enormously
complex and interconnected modern systems. Hence, we need suitable models, not
only of the system but also of its environment, especially its users. These models
are needed as basis for formal verification. Moreover, they feed into the complete
and structured argument in a safety case. We described how model-based safety
analysis and safety case development should ideally look like and derived a set of
open research issues that need to be addressed. We are currently in the process of
discussing with industrial partners first steps to tackle these issues.
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